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CASE COMIENTS
COSTS AS BETWEEN SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-JURISDIC-
TION OF EQUITY TO ALLOW
P after having established a lien on the proceeds of certain trust
bonds, filed a petition in a federal district court requesting that her
counsel fees and disbursements over and above statutory costs be -paid
out of the fund. Receipts from sale of the group of bonds securing
deposits on trust (like the one for which P had established a lien),
made up the fund. It was alleged that P had established as a matter
of law the right to recovery in relation to fourteen trusts in situations
like her own, and that the fund was more than sufficient to discharge
all trust obligations. The district court dismissed the petition on the
ground that it had authority to do nothing except carry out the decree
of the Supreme Court; the circuit court in affirming that ruling gave as
an additional reason the fact that the time for amending of P's petition
had expired. The Supreme Court held: the district court had jurisdic-
tion to entertain the petition.' The "claim for 'as between solicitor and
client' costs was not directly in issue in the original proceedings," and
therefore the lower court was not bound by the mandate of the
Supreme Court as to this point since a claim for such costs is not im-
pliedly included in the usual taxable costs. Such allowances "are con-
tingent upon the exigencies of equitable litigation." The additional
reason given by the circuit court falls because "the petition for reim-
bursement" was "an independent proceeding supplemental to the origi-
nal proceeding." Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 59 Sup. Ct. 777,
83 L. Ed. 1184 (1939).
The awarding of counsel fees is a matter of equitable discretion;
however, "parties holding particular characters" such as trustees,
administrators, personal representatives, mortgagees, creditors of insol-
vent estates, and legatees under special circumstances, are generally
allowed costs as between solicitor and client.2 Reimbursement for such
'On return of the case to the district court, costs "as between
solicitor and client" incurred in establishing plaintiff's lien to the pro-
ceeds of the bonds, were allowed; but "an allowance of fees and expens-
es (which were sought in a subsequent petition) incurred in obtaining
an allowance" was denied. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 28 F.
Supp. 229 (1939).
2 See generally 2 Daniell's Chancery Pleading and Practice (5th ed.
1879) Chapter XXXI, especially section 2.
In Kentucky this principle of eq'uitable jurisdiction has been codi-
fied as follows: ". . . in actions between parceners, tenants in com-
mon, joint tenants, and for settling the distribution and division of
deceased person's estates, and to settle partnerships, and to settle or
enforce trusts, courts shall have a judicial discretion in regard to costs."
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (1936), section 889.
Delaware has a broader statute than Kentucky. "A Court of Equity
. . . shall make such order concerning costs in every case as shall be
agreeable to equity." Revised Code of Delaware (1935), section 4907.
Persaps the greater number of the states (Iowa is an example)
which have statutes on the subject, treat various types of actions indi-
vidually and set maximum attorney's fees for each but leave the deter-
mination of whether any attorney's fees at all shall be taxed in the
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expenses has been denied parties guilty of misconduct. Thus a party
who instigates proceedings which are not reasonably necessary, or
introduces unnecessary witnesses may even be denied his costs as
between party and party1
The principal caae extends the application of the doctrine that
equity may under extraordinary circumstances in the exercise of its
discretion grant reimbursement for costs as between solicitor and
client. Equity has granted such allowances where the successful party
sued as a representative of a class' or has recovered a fund payable to a
class; 5 but the doctrine is now made applicable to situations in which
others recover, by reason of plaintiff's efforts, as a consequence of 8tare
decisis. The decree for P merely created a lien on the fund for the
amount due her; however, the beneficiaries of similar trusts In the
defendant bank would not have to undergo the expensive litigation borne
by plaintiff before they could establish their priorities to the proceeds
of the trust bonds.
The result obtained in this case is to be commended. Recovery
particular case, and if so how much, to the discretion of the court within
the limits prescribed by the statute.
32 Daniell's Chancery Pleading and Practice (5th ed. 1879) 1394;
Perry, Trusts and Trustees (7th ed. 1929), section 891.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has held that a trustee who is
an attorney, may himself defend attacks made upon the trust, and
recover for his services as an attorney; and that he is not guilty of
conduct against public policy. Norris v. Bishop 207 Ky. 621, 269 S. W.
751 (1925). However, costs as between solicitor and client have been
denied where the court is convinced that the party defending or pros-
ecuting an action is primarily pressing his personal claims and is
only incidentally seeking the interests of the class he purports to
represent. Goddard's Exr. v. Goddard, Jr., 164 Ky. 41, 174 S. W. 743
(1915).
'For example: Honderson v. Dodds, (1886) L. R. 2 Eq. 532, 14 L. T.
752, 14 W. R. 908 (Suit by creditors to administer realty. The realty
proved deficient. Costs as between party and party were taxed for
both plaintiffs and the defendant legatees, then plaintiffs' costs as
between solicitor and client, and the balance was paid to the creditors
in general); Jervis v. Wolferstan, (1874) L. R. 18 Eq. 18, 43 L. J. Ch.
809, 30 L. T. 452 (Suit by trustees for construction of trust settlements.
Costs of all parties as between solicitor and client were allowed);
Central Railroad and Baking Company of Georgia v. Pettus and Others,
113 U. S. 116, 5 S. Ct. 387, 28 L. Ed. 915 (1885) (Suit by attorney to
obtain a lien on funds received by persons not parties to the suit but
members of the class of creditors to which the solicitor's client
belonged); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 26 L. Ed. 1157 (1881)
(Holder of bonds in state improvement fund filed a bill alleging mis-
management and waste of the fund. During liquidation of the assets
of the fund, resulting from this litigation, plaintiff petitioned that his
costs as between solicitor and client be allowed out of the fund since
other bond holders would equally benefit from his recovery of the fund.
The petition was granted).
For example: Thomas v. Jones, 1 Dr. & Sm. 134, 62 Eng. Rep. 329
(1860) (Bill by a legatee for administration of the testator's estate.
It was held that plaintiff was suing for a class-the legatees-even
though no such assertion was made in the petition).
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by reason of stare decisis under the instant facts would in all probabil-
Ity require no more than filing of claims before the proper officials in
charge of the funds, since they would realize the futility of contesting
an action should they force a proceeding on the part of the claimants.
Surely equity Is not bound by form to the extent that substance would
be disregarded in a situation like this. The basic equitable factor here
as well as in the ordinary class suit is that it is no more than fair that
those who share the benefits of another's efforts should bear their por-
tion of the expenditures. Moreover, since the allowance of costs in any
given case is limited to reasonable expenses, if any be given, after a
consideration of all the circumstances, the principle on which recovery
may be had is reasonably free from inherent inducements encouraging
the use of it in an abusive manner.
CLArMCE COaNULiuS
TRADE SECRETS: SOLICITATION OF CUSTOMERS BY
FORMER EMPLOYEE
Defendant was employed by the plaintiff on oral contract to solicit
and deliver laundry. He was given a list of customers' names and
addresses in a particular territory, and was assigned that territory in
which to work. There was no express contract not to disclose the list
nor to solicit in competition with the plaintiff on the termination of
his employment. Plaintiff, apprehensive that defendant intended to
quit and go into the laundry business for himself, asked him to sign a
contract not to solicit the plaintiff's customers upon termination of
employment. Defendant refused to sign the contract, quit the employ-
ment of plaintiff, started a laundry of his own and began soliciting his
former employer's customers. The corporation brought an action to
restrain him from soliciting its customers. The court denied an injunc-
tion, stating that there was no confidential relation existing between
the parties, and a contract could not be implied. Woolley's Laundry,
Irn. v. Siva, 23 N. E. (2d) 899 (Mass. 1939).
If an employee makes an express contract not to disclose a list of
customers' names, nor to use it in competition with the employer, after
termination of the employment, equity will enforce it.' However, the
'Witkop-Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 61 Misc. 126, 112 N. Y. Supp. (1906)
(The court said: "The names of the customers of a business concern
whose trade and patronage have been secured by years of business
efforts and advertisement and the expenditure of time and money con-
stituting part of the good will of a business, which enterprise and fore-
sight have built up, should be deemed just as sacred and entitled to the
same protection as a secret compounding of some article of manufacture
or commerce"); Mutual Milk and Cream Co. v. Prigg, 112 App. Div. 652,
98 N. Y. Supp. 458 (1906) (Contract not to use the list in competition
with the employer at the termination of the employment enforced
against a minor).
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